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COMMENT
DOUBLE JEOPARDY, COMPLEX CRIMES
AND GRADY v. CORBIN
TATMANJ. SO
INTRODUCTION
N 1990, Dana Defendant was arrested for and convicted of possession
of drugs. In 1991, Dana Defendant was arrested again, this time for
distribution of drugs. For this offense, however, Dana was acquitted at
trial. Peter Prosecutor subsequently initiated prosecution under the
Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") statutes'
against Dana Defendant, using the prior offenses of drug possession and
drug distribution as "requisite predicate acts."2
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment3 mandates that no
one shall be tried twice for the same offense.4 Arguably, because Dana
Defendant was prosecuted for the predicate offenses (drug possession and
1. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
2. The major elements of proof for a RICO conviction are (1) the existence of an
"enterprise" that is (2) connected to a "pattern of racketeering activity." Proof of the
latter element is manifested by two or more "predicate acts." See United States v.
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988) (defining "racke-
teering activity"); id. at § 1961(4) (defining "enterprise"). These predicate acts are often
criminal violations of other statutes, and are chargeable as such. See ag., United States
v. Boldin, 772 F.2d 719 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (defendant charged with RICO crimes, predicate
narcotics offenses and conspiracies to commit the crimes), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048
(1986); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.) (defendant charged with RICO
crime and predicate tax evasion crimes), cert denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980).
The recent rise in statutory offenses with provisions that overlap and duplicate other
statutes ("complex crimes"), and the concomitant rise in multi-count indictments, have
complicated double jeopardy analysis. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 Yale L.J. 262,
279-80 (1965); Note, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses New Life for
a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 Yale LJ. 339, 342 (1956) [hereinafter Statutory
Implementation]; Note, Double Jeopardy and the Multiple-Count Indictment, 57 Yale L.J.
132, 132-33 (1947); Note, Double Jeopardy and the Concept of Identity of Offenses, 7
Brooklyn L. Rev. 79, 82 (1937); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10 (1970)
(noting that with advent of complex statutes and creative prosecution, potential for un-
constitutional reprosecution became more pronounced).
RICO is the quintessential complex crime, and will be used as the primary example in
the following discussion. There are, however, other crimes that are "complex crimes."
Examples include Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE"), 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988), in-
corporating the predicate drug offenses; felony-murder, incorporating the underlying
felonies; and statutory conspiracies, incorporating the substantive criminal acts of the
agreement.
3. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 2.
4. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957); see also United States v.
Jenkins, 490 F.2d 868, 870 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[T]he laws forbid the same man to be tried
twice on the same issue.") (quoting I Demosthenes 589 (Vance transl. 1962 ed.)), aff'd,
420 U.S. 358 (1975). Discussing ancient English pleas, Blackstone refers to the double
jeopardy protection as a "universal maxim ... that no man is to be brought into jeopardy
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
drug distribution) and then tried for the RICO crime, she was subjected
to several prosecutions for the same criminal acts and thus deprived of
her constitutional protection against double jeopardy.5 Nevertheless,
separate prosecutions of the RICO crime and its predicate offenses have
withstood constitutional challenges in the past on the ground that they
are not the same "offense" within the meaning of the double jeopardy
clause.6
The double jeopardy clause serves two functions, both of which should
be considered when faced with a double jeopardy problem. One tradi-
tional function of the double jeopardy prohibition has been to prevent
multiple prosecutions in more than one proceeding for the same con-
duct-in other words, to bar "successive prosecutions."7 The purpose of
this bar is to (1) ensure final resolution of substantive criminal issues;
(2) protect against overzealous prosecutors; (3) safeguard against incor-
rect verdicts;' and (4) prevent the imposition of multiple punishments
through successive prosecutions for essentially the same offense.9 In ad-
dition, double jeopardy law seeks to prohibit multiple punishment for the
of his life more than once for the same offence." 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the
Laws of England 1019 (Chase ed. 1878).
5. See generally Thomas, RICO Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy/Multiple
Punishment Problem, 78 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1359 (1984) (discussing double jeopardy
problems in RICO prosecutions); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 291, 401-12
(1983) (same); Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 Fordham
L. Rev. 165, 257-64, 268-70 (1980) (same); see also Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173 (Fla.
1981) (separate prosecutions of RICO and its predicate offenses are barred).
6. See cases cited infra note 62.
7. See, eg., J. Sigler, Double Jeopardy: The Development of a Legal and Social
Policy 27-33 (1969) (double jeopardy is "being tried a second time"); 1 J. Bishop, New
Commentaries on the Criminal Law 727 (Zane & Zollman 9th ed. 1923) (defendant "ex-
empt from any fresh prosecution" once in jeopardy).
8. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 277-96 (1965); Sigler, supra note 7,
at 156; infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text; see also Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161,
165-66 (1977) (noting other interests are involved in successive prosecution cases); Wes-
ten & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81, 84
(presenting three interests in double jeopardy: finality, avoiding double punishment and
nullification).
Justice Black, speaking for the Court in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957),
listed the three kinds of interests that the double jeopardy bar against successive prosecu-
tions is designed to protect:
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in [our] system of jurispru-
dence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to
make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
[1] subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and [2] compelling
him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as [3] enhanc-
ing the possibility that even though innocent he may be found guilty.
Green, 355 U.S. at 187-88; see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) ("[T]he
bar [against successive prosecutions] ensures that the State does not make repeated at-
tempts to convict an individual, thereby exposing him to continued embarrassment, anxi-
ety, and expense, while increasing the risk of an erroneous conviction or an impermissibly
enhanced sentence.").
9. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
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same offense in a single proceeding.' ° With complex crimes, however,
courts recently have lost sight of the first three policy concerns underly-
ing the bar against successive prosecutions, and instead have relied solely
on the prevention of multiple punishment as the basis for applying
double jeopardy principles."
Grady v. Corbin, 2 decided by the Supreme Court during its 1989
Term, raises questions about this trend in the case law of successive pros-
ecution. Corbin held that the protection against double jeopardy prohib-
its successive prosecutions if, to establish an essential element of the
crime charged, the government would have to prove conduct that consti-
tutes an offense for which the defendant had already been prosecuted.' 3
In so holding, the Corbin opinion recognized that successive prosecution
cases involve interests that do not arise in multiple punishment circum-
stances. 4 Perhaps the most profound implication of Corbin will be its
impact on RICO prosecutions. Some RICO prosecutions would presum-
ably violate the double jeopardy guarantee under Corbin's conduct-based
standard;" and, given the importance of RICO as a crime-fighting tool
over the last decade, this result could have significant consequences.
This Comment examines the state of double jeopardy jurisprudence in
light of Corbin, emphasizing Corbin's potential impact on complex
crimes such as RICO. Part I discusses the policies underlying double
jeopardy doctrine and the two basic approaches to the problem of what
constitutes the "same offense." Part II analyzes pre-Corbin judicial in-
terpretation of RICO cases, and argues that successive prosecution case
law with respect to complex crimes has unjustifiably broken with tradi-
tional successive prosecution case law developed in the context of simple
crimes. Part III examines Corbin itself and discusses the policies under-
lying its holding. In addition, this section gives a broad overview of the
implications of the Corbin decision and compares post-Corbin lower
court decisions in RICO prosecutions. This Comment concludes that
courts applying double jeopardy analysis to successive prosecutions in-
volving complex crimes should look at the policies underlying the bar
against successive prosecutions and use the Corbin decision as a guide to
that effect.
I. BACKGROUND
A. General Policies Underlying Double Jeopardy Jurisprudence
Double jeopardy law protects four basic interests inherent in our crim-
10. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 62-82 and accompanying text.
12. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
13. See id. at 2087.
14. See id at 2091-93.
15. Cf Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra note 5, at 405 ("Where two or more predicate
offenses are prosecuted separately from the RICO offense, double jeopardy should bar
separate prosecutions regardless of any legislative intent.").
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inal justice system. First, defendants have an interest in resolving the
issue of their guilt once and for all, rather than living with the "embar-
rassment, expense, . . . anxiety and insecurity" of repeated prosecu-
tions.1 6 Compared to other policy concerns of the double jeopardy
clause, however, this interest in finality 7 is the least important, and "can
be overridden by a strong and justifiable societal interest to the
contrary.""8
Preventing "the prosecutor from using criminal prosecutions to inflict
unnecessary suffering upon defendants" addresses the defendant's inter-
est in avoiding prosecutorial harassment.' 9 When the prosecutor could
have achieved his goal of conviction in one proceeding, separate trials
may impose an unjustified hardship on the defendant.20 Additionally,
because a criminal prosecution imposes a significant emotional and finan-
cial burden on defendants and is hence a powerful prosecutorial weapon,
allowing separate trials would increase the potential for government arbi-
trariness and tyranny.2'
A third function of double jeopardy law is to preserve the jury's pre-
rogative to resolve the factual issues of the case, especially when that
resolution leads to a finding of innocence. When a defendant has been
previously acquitted, a subsequent prosecution risks an "erroneous con-
viction" at the second trial.2 The double jeopardy clause preserves the
16. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957); see also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.
519 (1975) (state procedure of separate proceedings violated defendant's interest in final-
ity because single prosecution could have served state's interest equally well).
17. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 8, at 84.
18. Id. at 161; see also Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498-99 (1984) (society's interest
in law enforcement may supersede defendant's interest in finality); United States v. Tateo,
377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964) (same). For example, the prosecution is allowed one "full and
fair opportunity" to prove the defendant's guilt. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
15-16 (1978). When the prosecution is denied that opportunity, society's interest in law
enforcement can overcome the defendant's interest in finality. See United States v. Jorn,
400 U.S. 470, 483-84 (1971); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
But see Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970) (state's interest in vesting its prose-
cutors with sovereign authority to prosecute without regard to whether defendant was
already tried by municipal prosecutor not sufficient to override defendant's interest in
finality).
19. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 278. When the subsequent prosecution
could have been resolved in the previous trial, initiating the later proceeding without
justification constitutes prosecutorial harassment. See id. at 288; see also Palko v. Con-
necticut, 302 U.S. 319, 328 (1937) (state may not wear out defendant by multitude of
trials). Constitutional joinder of all counts would be required at the first trial unless the
government has some reasonable justification.
20. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 286-88.
21. See McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23 Washburn L.J. 1, 18
& n. 19 (1983); Note, The Double Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, 89
Yale L.J. 962, 964 n.15 (1980) [hereinafter Bar to Reintroducing Evidence]; see also
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569 (1977) ("At the heart of
[double jeopardy protection] is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subjcct
the citizen to a second trial for the same offense would arm Government with a potent
instrument of oppression.").
22. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 (1984). When the defendant has been found
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jury's authority to acquit and the defendant's opportunity to be acquitted
by preventing subsequent convictions by other juries based on the same
evidence,23 thereby maintaining the binding integrity of acquittals.24
Finally, when a defendant has been convicted and punished for a par-
ticular crime, the double jeopardy bar against successive prosecutions
safeguards against the danger that the defendant would be given addi-
tional punishment for that crime if convicted again. 5 The problem of
multiple punishments, or multiplicity, also arises when the prosecution
charges several statutory violations in a single proceeding.26 If the de-
fendant is given consecutive sentences for the same conduct under two
different statutes, she may be deprived of her double jeopardy guarantee
because she has been punished twice for the same offense, albeit in a
single proceeding.27
An important distinction exists, then, between successive prosecution
cases, which involve several proceedings, and multiple punishment cases,
which involve only one proceeding. When the government prosecutes
several statutory violations in a single proceeding, the defendant,
although faced with the spectre of multiple punishment, is not con-
fronted with the additional dangers inherent in successive prosecutions.
The defendant's interest in finality of the issue is not implicated in a sin-
gle proceeding because there is only one prosecution and hence a defini-
tive resolution of the criminal issues. Furthermore, the singularity of the
guilty, an erroneous conviction is not an issue at the second trial because his guilt had
already been adjudicated.
23. See, eg., Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 280 ("Double jeopardy should
guarantee that the defendant need convince only one jury of his innocence."); Westen &
Drubel, supra note 8, at 122-23 (discussing interest of nullification after jury acquittal).
Moreover, a subsequent prosecution after acquittal would give the prosecutor a chance
to refine his trial strategy by taking out the damaging and unnecessary evidence while
compiling evidence to rebut the defense presented during the prior prosecution. See Wes-
ten & Drubel, supra note 8, at 161. Thus, the prosecutor has a better chance in convict-
ing the defendant during the second prosecution. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447
(1970). Given that one jury has already acquitted the defendant, a later conviction would
be unfair and potentially erroneous.
24. Cf Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 278 ("[Ihe double jeopardy bar on
reprosecution after an acquittal makes the status of innocence meaningful and minimizes
the chance that innocent men will be convicted.").
25. See United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1975). One commentator has
argued that the idea behind successive prosecutions is solely to prevent the imposition of
multiple punishment on the defendant. See M. Friedland, Double Jeopardy 195-204 pas-
sim (1969); see also Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873) ("It is the punish-
ment that would legally follow the second conviction which is the real danger guarded
against by the [double jeopardy clause]."); cf Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at
267 ("[TIhe two rules [against successive prosecutions and multiple punishment] have a
common core policy. They prevent prosecutors and courts from prosecuting and punish-
ing arbitrarily, without legitimate justification.").
26. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text; see generally Comment, Cumulative
Sentences for One Criminal Transaction Under the Double Jeopardy Clause: Whalen v.
United States, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 819 (1981) (discussing multiple punishment issue).
27. See North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 718-19 (1969); Ex Parte Lange, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 168-69 (1873).
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proceeding prevents the prosecutor from utilizing different trials to hone
prosecutorial skills and to harass the defendant. Finally, the defendant's
risk of an erroneous conviction is not enhanced because there was no
prior acquittal by the jury.
B. Differing Approaches to the Definition of "Same Offense"
The double jeopardy clause prohibits successive prosecutions28 and
multiple punishments29 for the same offense. In determining when to
apply the double jeopardy bar, courts have used two tests to define "same
offense." 3
The "same-transaction" test looks at the sequence of events triggered
by the defendant's conduct-the "criminal transaction"-and requires
that all charges arising from one criminal transaction be prosecuted to-
gether at a single trial.31 Because the same-transaction test requires pros-
ecution of all statutory violations of the crime in a single proceeding and
hence precludes continued and consecutive prosecutions for the same of-
fense, the test is an appropriate standard in dealing with successive prose-
cution issues. The same-transaction test is unsuited for multiple
punishment cases, however, because it could define several statutory vio-
lations as the "same offense" and thereby require only one punishment
for their violations, frustrating contrary legislative intent.3 2
In contrast, the "same-evidence" test focuses on the elements of crimi-
nal offenses as defined by the legislature and on the proof that the prose-
cution will put forth to satisfy those elements.33 When the legislative
elements and the required evidence of two statutes are distinct, prosecu-
tion under both statutes will not be prohibited.34 With certain excep-
28. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957); United States v. Ball, 163
U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
29. See Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173 (1873); see also North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (double jeopardy clause also protects against multiple
punishment for the same offense).
30. See Note, Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, supra note 21, at 965; Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 269.
31. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 and n.7 (1970) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Note, Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, supra note 21, at 967-68; Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 275-76; see also Commonwealth v. Campana, 452 Pa. 233, 304
A.2d 432 (1973) (applying same transaction test); Kellett v. Superior Court, 63 Cal.2d
822, 48 Cal. Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206 (1966) (same).
32. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 275 n.59; cf. Whalen v. United
States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980) (Congress has authority to create crimes and proscribe
punishment for those crimes; double jeopardy clause only limits courts from overstepping
bounds that Congress has created). Moreover, the application of the same-transaction
test is made difficult by the varying definitions of "act" or "transaction." See Note, Twice
in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 275-77; Note, Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, supra note 21,
at 968-69.
33. See Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 270-73.
34. See infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. In essence, the test defers to the
legislature in defining criminal offenses. This, however, does not encompass the full pa-
rameters of double jeopardy protection. See infra note 38 and accompanying text.
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tions,35 federal courts prior to Corbin applied the same-evidence test in
the context of both successive prosecutions16 and multiple punishment.37
Because it allows successive prosecutions so long as the legislative ele-
ments of the offenses are different and the prosecution introduces differ-
ent sets of proof, however, the same-evidence test does not adequately
address policies and circumstances underlying the fundamental double
jeopardy bar against successive prosecutions.38 As discussed below, the
Supreme Court in Corbin, by rejecting the same-evidence test as the sole
double jeopardy hurdle and adopting a conduct-based standard, 9 ad-
dressed this and other' inadequacies in modem federal double jeopardy
jurisprudence.4"
II. PRE-CORBIN JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
AND RICO
A. Multiple Punishment
In Blockburger v. United States,42 the Supreme Court enunciated the
modem formulation of the same-evidence test by stating that where the
same act may violate two different statutes, the two statutory offenses are
not deemed the "same" if each requires proof of an additional fact that
the other does not.43 The Blockburger Court, facing the question of mul-
tiple punishment, characterized the issue as one of statutory construction
rather than purely double jeopardy.' Under Blockburger, legislative in-
tent to create different and separate crimes is manifested by the distinct
sets of proof.45 Blockburger, therefore, used the same-evidence test for
35. See cases cited infra note 38.
36. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977); Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S.
338, 342 (1911) (citing Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871)).
37. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
38. See Note, Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, supra note 21, at 966-67; The Supreme
Court, 1976 Term, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 70, 106-14 (1977); Sigler, supra note 7, at 222-28;
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 273-75. Reference to a same-transaction test
may therefore be appropriate. See, e.g., Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682-83 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (same-transaction test would bar successive prosecutions be-
cause both prosecutions concerned the same criminal acts, notwithstanding violations of
different statutes); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1970) (collateral estoppel bars
state from relitigating same issues in second trial, despite different evidence).
39. Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2089 (1990).
40. See infra notes 62-86 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
42. 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
43. See id at 304. The same-evidence test was first applied in this country in Morey
v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433 (1871).
44. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303-05. This is a judicial application of the Ashwan-
der principle, where the court would resolve a case based on statutory construction rather
than constitutional interpretation if possible. See Ashwander v. T.V.A., 297 U.S. 288,
346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S.
490, 500 (1979) ("an Act of Congress ought not be construed to violate the Constitution
if any other possible construction remains available").
45. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 303-05. Moreover, the Court has held that Congress
1991]
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the purposes of determining legislative intent rather than for the pur-
poses of defining what offenses constitute the "same offense" within the
meaning of the double jeopardy prohibition. Yet despite its self-defined
role as a tool of statutory construction, the "Blockburger test" remained
the standard for determining whether prosecution and punishment under
two statutes would violate double jeopardy law.46
Because the Blockburger test centers on statutory construction and is
hence a guide to legislative intent, subsequent case law has deemed its
application unnecessary where legislative intent is unambiguous.47 Clear
evidence of legislative intent to permit separate punishment is dispositive
of the multiple punishment issue, and rebuts any presumption that may
arise from application of the Blockburger test.48 This rule of deference to
legislative intent has been applied consistently to both complex49 and
simple crimes when dealing with multiple punishment issues.
has the legislative authority to define crimes and proscribe punishment for their viola-
tions; and that, with respect to cumulative punishment, the double jeopardy clause does
no more than prevent courts from imposing greater punishment than the legislature in-
tended. See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1980); see also Missouri v.
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) (courts may impose cumulative punishment where
legislature specifically authorizes such punishment); cf. Ball v. United States, 470 U.S.
856, 861-64 (1985) (double jeopardy protection precludes conviction for receipt of fire-
arms and possession of firearms because Congress did not intend to create double punish-
ment by overlap in statutes).
46. See Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151 (1977); Iannelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975); United States v. Cowartz, 595 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir.
1979).
47. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
48. See, e.g., Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983) (where legislature spe-
cifically authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, court's task of statutory
construction ends and it may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a
single trial, regardless of whether those statutes proscribe "same" conduct under Block-
burger); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340-41 (1981) (Blockburger test pro-
vides method of ascertaining legislative intent only when nothing more concrete is
available); lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785-86 & n. 17 (1975) (Blockburger rule
is only rebuttable presumption of legislative intent); see also supra note 45 (discussing
congressional legislative authority to create crimes and proscribe punishment for those
crimes).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1049-50 (6th Cir.) (convictions
and sentence for RICO crime and predicate crimes do not violate multiplicity aspect of
double jeopardy because Congress intended separate offenses and punishment), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 287-88 (5th Cir.
1981) (same); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 833 (1980); United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 306 (7th Cir. 1979) (same),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir.
1979) (same), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980); cf Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S.
684, 689 (1980) (Congress has authority to create crimes and proscribe punishment for
those crimes; double jeopardy only functions to limit courts from overstepping bounds
that Congress has created); see generally Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, State-
ment of Findings and Purpose, 84 Stat. 922, reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News 1073, 1073 (purpose underlying RICO is to establish new penal prohibitions and
provide enhanced sanctions to combat organized criminal enterprises).
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B. Successive Prosecutions
1. Case Law Dealing with Simple Crimes: The "Greater and Lesser
Included Offense" Doctrine
In Brown v. Ohio,5" the Supreme Court extended the Blockburger for-
mulation of the same-evidence test to apply to successive prosecutions of
simple crimes." In contrast to Blockburger and its emphasis on statu-
tory construction, however, the Brown Court used the Blockburger same-
evidence test for the purposes of defining the "same offense" without re-
gard to legislative intent.5 2 As such, the Brown decision impliedly ac-
knowledged policy concerns 3 particular to successive prosecutions that
Blockburger, which was solely concerned with a multiple punishment is-
sue, ignored.
When all the elements of one offense are included in the greater set of
elements of another offense, the former offense is a "lesser included of-
fense" of the latter. Because proof of a lesser included offense requires no
proof beyond that of the greater offense, the greater and lesser offenses
are the "same offense" pursuant to Blockburger's same-evidence stan-
dard.5" Pursuant to this analysis, the Brown Court held that successive
50. 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
51. See icL at 166; see also United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1005-06 (5th Cir.
1981) ("The Blockburger test is the test for determining whether two offenses are the
same for purposes of barring successive prosecutions as well as simultaneous prosecu-
tions."), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982).
The Brown Court stated that "[i]f two offenses are the same... for purposes of barring
consecutive sentences at a single trial, they necessarily will be the same for purposes of
barring successive prosecutions." Brown, 432 U.S. at 166. Although Brown used the
same-evidence criterion in the context of successive prosecutions, the effect of the deci-
sion may be an incorporation of a same-transaction test into the facts of the case. See.
e.g., Brown, 432 U.S. at 170 (Brennan, J., concurring) (advocating application of same-
transaction test); Westen & Drubel, supra note 8, at 163 ("If [Brown] was correctly de-
cided, it was because the Court implicitly held that the Double Jeopardy Clause requires
the State to join in a single prosecution all offenses that share the same factual core in
common, at least where the common factual core is as great as that between joyriding and
auto theft."). The opinion itself, however, adopts the same-evidence test as formulated by
Blockburger. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 166. To the extent that a same-evidence test inade-
quately protects against successive prosecutions, see supra note 38 and accompanying
text, the Brown decision recognized that inadequacy and states that there are some fac-
tual situations where successive prosecutions would be barred despite the analysis under
Blockburger. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 166-67 n.6.
52. The Brown Court framed the question in double jeopardy terms rather than in
statutory construction terms. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 164.
Traditional successive prosecution analysis, therefore, does not have a "deference-to-
legislative-intent" restriction that is attendant with multiple punishment cases. Cf Wes-
ten & Drubel, supra note 8, at 121-22 n.188 ("Although the Blockburger [test] operates as
nothing more than a rebuttable presumption for purposes of multiple punishment, it may
have a stricter and more rigid application in the context of multiple prosecution.").
53. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
54. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 168; see also Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 682 (1977)
(per curiam) ("the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution for the lesser crime after
conviction of the greater one"); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 188 (1889) ("a person [who]
has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it....
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prosecutions and multiple punishment of "greater and lesser included of-
fenses" are barred by the double jeopardy clause. 55 Foreseeing a problem
in applying this doctrine to "greater offenses" that could not have been
charged at the time of a previous indictment because certain elements of
proof were lacking,56 the Brown Court introduced an exception, under
which successive prosecution would not be barred when all the events
necessary for prosecution of the greater offense had not yet taken place or
were not yet discovered.57
Subsequently, in Illinois v. Vitale,"5 the Supreme Court held that where
proof of the greater offense does not always require proof of the lesser
offense, the prosecution may withstand double jeopardy scrutiny. 9 The
Vitale Court stated in dictum, however, that if the second prosecution in
fact relies on proof of the lesser offense, the defendant would have a "sub-
stantial claim of double jeopardy."' ° The Supreme Court recently
cannot be a second time tried for one of those incidents without being twice put in jeop-
ardy for the same offence").
55. See Brown, 432 U.S. at 168. The Brown Court noted that Blockburger is not the
only test to be applied in successive prosecution cases. "Even if two offenses are suffi-
ciently different to permit the imposition of [multiple punishment], successive prosecu-
tions will be barred in some circumstances where the second prosecution requires the
relitigation of factual issues already resolved by the first." Id. at 166 n.6. Brown, which
speaks best for successive prosecution cases, is not affected by the Supreme Court's limi-
tation of the Blockburger test because the limitation only concerned the multiple punish-
ment issue. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
56. Complex crimes often fall into this category because they require multiple predi-
cate offenses, and the second predicate offense may not occur until after the prosecution
for the first predicate offense.
57. See Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7; see also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S.
442, 448-49 (1912) (greater offense prosecution of murder allowed after lesser offense
prosecution of assault and battery, because victim died after prior prosecution). Such an
exception is consistent with the policies underlying the bar against successive prosecu-
tions. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text. There is little chance of
prosecutorial misconduct and harassment because the missing elements are not within
the control of the prosecution. An erroneous conviction of the second crime is unlikely
because the first jury was not presented with the missing elements of proof which consti-
tute that crime. The defendant's interest in finality is outweighed by society's interest
that culpable persons should be punished for their crimes.
58. 447 U.S. 410 (1980).
59. See id. at 419.
60. See id at 420-21. The Vitale Court apparently recognized the difference in apply-
ing the Blockburger standard in the abstract and on the specific facts of a case. An ab-
stract application of the Blockburger standard warrants merely a reading of the statutes
to determine whether they have the same requirements of proof. A fact-based application
of the Blockburger standard necessitates a review of the actual proof the prosecution puts
forth to satisfy those elements, and the double jeopardy bar operates where the prosecu-
tion essentially offers the same set of proof to meet the different statutory requirements.
As such, a fact-based application of the Blockburger standard is more stringent, and a
particular set of facts may pass Blockburger muster in the abstract but violate double
jeopardy constraints when the prosecution proffers the identical facts in proving its cases.
See generally Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 269-70 (discussing difference be-
tween "required," "alleged" and "actual" evidence tests); infra notes 62-64 and accompa-
nying text (criticizing abstract application of Blockburger in RICO cases).
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adopted this dictum as holding in Grady v. Corbin."'
2. Case Law Dealing with Complex Crimes: A Statutory
Construction Approach
With the advent of complex crimes, courts addressing the successive
prosecution issue have adopted a different approach than that developed
in the context of simple crimes. Pursuant to Brown, courts dealing with
successive prosecutions of RICO and its predicate crimes have looked to
Blockburger's same-evidence test. These courts have misapplied the
standard, however, by focusing solely on the legislative elements of the
offenses and holding that RICO and its predicate acts are not the "same
offense" because each could require proof of an additional element not
included in the other offenses.62 This does not follow from Brown's logic,
promulgated in the context of simple crimes, because proof of the predi-
cate offenses is specifically incorporated into proof of the RICO offense.63
As such, one offense does not have an additional element that the other
61. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1990). The facts of Vitale and Corbin
are remarkably similar in that they both involve traffic offenses. Compare Vitale, 447
U.S. at 411-15 (1980) with Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2087-90.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1986) (RICO of-
fense not the same as one of its predicate offenses because it requires proof of an "enter-
prise" and a second predicate act), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987); United States v.
Schell, 775 F.2d 559, 568 (4th Cir. 1985) (RICO offense and predicate offense each re-
quires different proof), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Boldin, 772
F.2d 719, 727 (lth Cir. 1985) (predicate acts and RICO offenses not the same), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986); United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1009 n.55, 1015
(5th Cir. 1981) (facts underlying prior convictions of predicate offenses can be used to
support later RICO charge), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982); United States v. Aleman,
609 F.2d 298, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1979) (predicate act count and RICO count do not violate
double jeopardy, at least where each requires, in part, different proof), cerL denied, 445
U.S. 946 (1980); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir.) (prosecution of
RICO count requires proof of facts not required by predicate count and therefore does
not violate double jeopardy clause), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 931 (1978); see also United
States v. Persico, 774 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cit. 1985) (predicate offenses to which defendant
pled guilty in first prosecution can be used in subsequent proceeding for RICO crime
continuing after plea to prior offenses). But cf. Pandelli v. United States, 635 F.2d 533,
537-38 (6th Cir. 1980) (although statutes have distinct elements of proof in theory, gov-
ernment's reliance on same proof during trial makes violations of statutes the same of-
fese, notwithstanding Blockburger construction).
Because successive prosecution cases also involve a multiple punishment issue, see
supra note 25 and accompanying text, courts will have to address both aspects of double
jeopardy violation in these cases. See, e.g., Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 777
(1985) (Court addressing successive prosecution issue, then turning to multiple punish-
ment issue); Grayson, 795 F.2d at 282-83 (same).
63. See, e.g., Carlson v. State, 405 So. 2d 173, 176 (Fla. 1981) (state RICO and its
predicate acts are greater and lesser included offenses); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, supra
note 5, at 405 ("The relationship of a RICO offense to the predicate offenses is clearly
that of greater and lesser-included offenses. Predicate offenses are lesser included within
[RICO] since the elements of these crimes must be established to prove the commission of
the racketeering activity."); see also United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1374 (2d
Cir.) (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe sweep of the RICO statute ... require[s] more
than analysis of the statutory elements; it require[s] analysis of the specific allegations in
the case."), cert denied, 474 U.S. 819 (1985).
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lacks; RICO and its predicate acts are therefore "greater and lesser in-
cluded offenses" based on strict application of Brown and Vitale.' More
importantly, the courts, in an attempt to justify their holdings, have
adopted multiple punishment analysis by emphasizing clear evidence of
legislative intent to create a new crime when enacting RICO,6 and con-
sequently have provided a foundation for a blanket complex-crime
exception.66
Given these analytical problems under simple crime rules, some courts
have moved even further away from the simple crime approach to suc-
cessive prosecution cases and have implied that there is an exception to
successive prosecution double jeopardy analysis for complex crimes.67
Perhaps the clearest, and most forceful, enunciation of this exodus came
in the form of dictum made by the Supreme Court in Garrett V. United
States.
68
Garrett dealt with whether a Continuing Criminal Enterprise
("CCE")69 charge and its predicate crimes were "greater and lesser in-
cluded offenses," which would bar multiple punishment and successive
prosecution for the CCE crime.70 On the multiple punishment issue, the
64. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text; supra note 63.
65. See Grayson, 795 F.2d at 282; Boldin, 772 F.2d at 728-30; United States v. Lica-
voli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1049-50 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); Phillips, 664
F.2d at 1009 n.55, 1015; Aleman, 609 F.2d at 306; United States v. Solano, 605 F.2d
1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1020 (1980). But see Tarlow, RICO
Revisited, supra note 5, at 405 ("Where two or more predicate acts are prosecuted sepa-
rately from the RICO offense, double jeopardy should bar separate prosecutions regard-
less of any legislative intent.") (emphasis added).
66. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
67. See Grayson, 795 U.S. at 283; Boldin, 772 F.2d at 727-28; Licavoli, 725 F.2d at
1049-50; Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1015; see also United States v. Hawkins, 658 F.2d 279, 288
(5th Cir. 1981) (discussing difficulty when applying double jeopardy analysis in RICO
statutes); United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 833 (1980); cf Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 708-09 (1980) (Rehnquist, I.,
dissenting) ("[Tihe Blockburger test, although useful in identifying statutes that define
greater and lesser included offenses in the traditional sense, is less satisfactory, and per-
haps even misdirected, when applied to statutes defining 'compound' and 'predicate' of-
fenses. . . . [M]ultiplicity of predicates creates problems when one attempts to apply
Blockburger.").
68. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
69. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988). CCE is very similar to RICO in that it requires
predicate acts as necessary elements of proof. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 775-77; see also 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1988) (elements of the statute). Moreover, the legislative intent of CCE
was to create a separate offense with additional punishment for engaging in a continuing
"drug enterprise." See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 777-87. Thus, both the structure and the
legislative intent of CCE are almost identical to that of RICO. See supra notes 1-2.
Given that the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed the double jeopardy
problems attendant to RICO prosecutions, the Court's resolution of this issue in the con-
text of a CCE charge is particularly relevant to the discussion.
70. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 775. The Supreme Court was faced with a similar issue in
Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977), where the question posed was whether a
conspiracy was a lesser-included offense of the CCE charge because it required no proof
beyond that required by the CCE offense. See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 149-50. The Court did
not rule on the issue, however, finding instead that because the defendant demanded sepa-
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Court held that Congress intended to permit multiple punishment for
both the CCE crime and the predicate offenses and that such intent is
dispositive of the issue."'
On the successive prosecution issue, the Garrett Court held that the
separate prosecutions did not violate double jeopardy protection because
the criminal conduct comprising the CCE charge went beyond the prior
prosecution of the predicate offense.72 The situation in Garrett therefore
falls within the exception, noted in Brown, that successive prosecutions
are not barred when additional facts arose after the first proceeding.7 3
The Garrett Court distinguished Brown's "greater and lesser included
offense" doctrine by stating that a complex crime such as the CCE
charge "does not lend itself to the simple analogy of a single course of
conduct" comprised of lesser included offenses.7,4 Yet because the Gar-
rett facts fit within the exception expressed in Brown,75 its language per-
taining to the inapplicability of Brown's "greater and lesser included
offense" doctrine to complex crimes is dictum. Indeed, another reading
of Garrett's dictum could suggest that because complex crimes often con-
rate trials for the two charges despite the government's attempt to consolidate the trials,
the defendant was deemed to have waived his double jeopardy claim. See id. at 152, 154.
71. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 793-95. Although the Court inJeffers did not decide the
"greater and lesser included offenses" issue, the Court nevertheless assumed for purposes
of argument that the conspiracy offense was a lesser included offense of the CCE crime.
See Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 148-50. The Court, however, went on to state that the "critical
inquiry" for double jeopardy purposes is "whether Congress intended to punish each
statutory violation separately." Id at 155. The Court then concluded that Congress did
not intend to punish both offenses separately. See id at 155-58. Jeffers, therefore, may
stand for the proposition that, even if one offense is a lesser included offense of a complex
crime and separate prosecutions would thus be barred, where the issue is one of multiple
punishment the dispositive question is still whether the legislature intended separate and
cumulative punishment. Such a reading of Jeffers would restrict the "greater and lesser
included offense" doctrine to Brown's facts, namely successive prosecutions. But see
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (double jeopardy "forbids successive prosecu-
tion and cumulative punishment for a greater and lesser included offense") (emphasis
added).
72. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 791-93; see also Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442
(1912) (previous prosecution of assault and battery does not bar later prosecution of
homicide when victim dies after first indictment); cf United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470,
483-84 (1971) ("the Double Jeopardy Clause does not guarantee a defendant that the
Government will be prepared, in all circumstances, to vindicate the social interest in law
enforcement through the vehicle of a single proceeding for a given offense").
73. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
74. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 788-89 (1985). Justice O'Connor ac-
knowledged that separate prosecutions of the predicate offenses and the CCE crime may
infringe upon the particular interests involved in the double jeopardy bar against separate
prosecutions, but argued that it "does not leave the defendant unduly exposed to oppres-
sive tactics by the Government." Id at 798 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She stated that
the defendant is protected from prosecutorial misconduct because "[a]ny acquittal on a
predicate offense would... bar the Government from later attempting to relitigate is-
sues" in a subsequent CCE prosecution. Id. Given the Court's recent decision in Dow-
ling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), however, that protection is somewhat in doubt.
See infra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
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tinue after the predicate offense, application of Brown's "greater and
lesser included offense" doctrine could prove problematic. This problem,
however, has already been addressed and resolved by the exception noted
in Brown,76 an exception within which the Garrett facts fall. Of those
circuits that have dealt with successive prosecutions of RICO and its
predicates before the Corbin decision, at least one court expressly carved
out an exception to successive prosecution case law for complex crimes,77
based squarely on Garrett's dictum.
In United States v. Grayson,78 the Third Circuit inferred that succes-
sive prosecution analysis developed in the context of simple crimes was
not applicable to complex crimes.7 9 Framing the "ultimate question of
whether two offenses are the same [as] one of legislative intent,"80 the
Grayson court held that Congress intended to permit successive prosecu-
tions of RICO and its predicate offenses.8"
C. The Statutory Construction Approach Analyzed
In relying on legislative intent as dispositive of the successive prosecu-
tion issue, courts have adopted multiple punishment case law that does
not address the policy implications 2 of successive prosecutions and have
made an exception to traditional successive prosecution case law for
complex crimes.13 The courts' adoption of an approach promulgated in
the context of multiple punishment for resolution of successive prosecu-
tion issues in complex crime cases ignores policies 4 that are inherent in
successive prosecution questions.
Returning to the case of Dana Defendant posited at the outset of this
76. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
77. See United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1054 (1987); see also United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1049-50 (6th Cir.) (in light
of legislative intent, prior bribery conviction may be used as predicate of RICO charge),
cert denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984). But cf. United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 711 (2d
Cir. 1987) (declining to resolve "this thorny issue"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
78. 795 F.2d 278 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987).
79. See id. at 281-282.
80. Id. at 282.
81. See id. at 282-83. This decision forms the basis of a later Third Circuit case,
United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009
(1991), which held that Corbin, the most recent simple crime successive prosecution case,
does not apply to complex crimes. See infra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
Pungitore's complex-crime exception has since been adopted by other circuits. See infra
note 129 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
83. The Supreme Court has also indicated that an exception for complex crimes is
inappropriate. In Jeff'ers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137 (1977), the court of appeals had
held that a prior Supreme Court case, Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975),
created a "complex statutory crimes" exception to double jeopardy analysis of "lesser
included" offenses. In dictum, the Supreme Court rejected this contention: "Contrary to
the suggestion of the Court of Appeals, lanelli created no exception ... to generaljeop-
ardy principles for complex statutory crimes." Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added).
84. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
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Comment, the interests protected by the double jeopardy bar against suc-
cessive prosecutions are present in her RICO trial.
Having paid the penalty for her drug possession conviction, and hav-
ing been acquitted of her drug distribution charge, Dana would expect
that the substantive issues as to those criminal acts have been resolved.
Yet Dana Defendant finds that she must defend against a subsequent
RICO charge that incorporates her previous offenses as predicate ele-
ments of proof. Consequently, Dana Defendant is being subjected to an
additional trial for the same criminal acts, which contradicts any notion
of finality implied by resolution of Dana's previous criminal proceedings.
Additionally, Peter Prosecutor could have added a RICO charge dur-
ing the 1991 prosecution for drug distribution because he already had the
required predicate acts to sustain the charge. The RICO issue would
have been resolved in the earlier case and Dana Defendant would have
been saved the unjustified hardship of a second prosecution.
Moreover, given that Dana Defendant was acquitted of the predicate
drug distribution charge, an acquittal on the RICO charge in the same
trial would have been likely because a RICO conviction requires proof of
at least two predicate acts.85 Instead, Peter Prosecutor would be able to
evaluate his drug distribution case, gauge its strengths and weaknesses,
and modify accordingly; in effect, he would be "treat[ing] the first trial as
no more than a dry run" 6 for the subsequent RICO prosecution, thereby
enhancing the risk of an erroneous conviction and undermining the in-
tegrity of a previous jury's acquittal.
Under the statutory construction approach adopted from multiple
punishment case law, the subsequent RICO prosecution would not be
barred because of clear congressional intent to separate RICO and its
predicate offenses.87 This approach, however, ignores Dana Defendant's
other substantive interests and would permit an arguably unconstitu-
tional RICO prosecution. By focusing on proof of the defendant's con-
duct that is put forth at subsequent trials, the Corbin standard"' would
prohibit the subsequent RICO prosecution against Dana Defendant and
would more fully protect Dana's double jeopardy interests.8 9
85. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S.
831 (1984). Moreover, merely proving two predicate acts is not enough. The court must
also consider whether the predicate acts are sufficiently related to one another to form a
pattern of racketeering. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381 (2d Cir.
1989) (en banc); Note, Bifurcated Jury Deliberations in Criminal RICO Trials, 57 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 745, 746 n.13 (1989); supra note 2.
86. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 447 (1970).
87. See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Statement of Findings and Purpose,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1073, 1073.
88. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 148-54 and ac' ompanying text.
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III. GRADY V CORBIN
In Grady v. Corbin," Thomas Corbin was served with traffic citations
for driving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of the median.9'
The county judge allowed Corbin to plead guilty to the traffic violations,
unaware of the fact that a person Corbin had hit had died in the hospi-
tal.92 After his subsequent indictment on vehicular homicide charges,
Corbin raised the double jeopardy argument that he had previously been
convicted of the lesser included offenses.93
A. Decision and Dissents
In a 5-4 decision written by Justice Brennan, 94 the Supreme Court
held that double jeopardy prohibits successive prosecutions if, to estab-
90. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
91. See id. at 2087-88 (1990); see also Corbin v. Hillery, 74 N.Y.2d 279, 282-83, 543
N.E.2d 714, 715-16, 545 N.Y.S.2d 71, 72-73 (1989) (supplying further factual
background).
92. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2088. The prosecutor present during the proceeding was
also unaware of this fact, and thus did not bring it to the court's attention during the plea
proceeding. See id at 2089.
93. See id; see also Corbin v. Hillery, 74 N.Y.2d 279, 284-85, 543 N.E.2d 714, 716-
17, 545 N.Y.S.2d 71, 73-74 (1989) (lower court proceedings).
The New York State Dutchess County Court denied Corbin's motion, finding that his
previous silence regarding the deaths of the victims to be a "material misrepresentation of
fact," which, the county court reasoned, precluded him from asserting his double jeop-
ardy claim. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2089 (1990). Corbin then sought a
writ of prohibition to bar prosecution of all counts in the indictment. The Appellate
Division denied the motion, but the New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
prosecution of the vehicular manslaughter counts would violate the guarantee against
double jeopardy because driving while intoxicated was a "lesser included offense of sec-
ond degree vehicular manslaughter." Id The court further barred the remaining counts
because the prosecution would have to rely on proof of acts that were previously adjudi-
cated against the defendant. See id. The court reasoned that it would contravene Vitale's
dictum that such a prosecution would result in a "substantial" claim of double jeopardy.
See i ; see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (discussion of Vitale holding
and dictum). The Supreme Court granted certiorari, see Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 362
(1989), and affirmed, see Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095.
94. Because Justice Brennan, who wrote the 5-4 Corbin decision, is no longer with
the Court, and because the decision had strong dissents, the Corbin holding may itself be
in jeopardy. Cf Burt, Precedent and Authority in Antonin Scalia's Jurisprudence, 12 Car-
dozo L. Rev. 1685, 1685 (1991) ("More openly than any other Justice sitting today, [Jus-
tice] Scalia is ready to reverse prior Supreme Court precedent."). A concrete example of
the present Court's willingness to reverse prior precedent can be seen in Payne v. Tennes-
see, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991), which summarily overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496
(1987), and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), two important Eighth
Amendment cases concerning the admissibility of victim impact evidence in a capital
sentencing proceeding. Dissenting from the majority opinion in Payne, Justice Marshall
stated: "Power, not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking ...
Neither the law nor the facts supporting Booth and Gathers underwent any change in the
last four years. Only the personnel of this Court did." Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2619 (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting). Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that the Justices who were in the
Corbin minority were in the Garrett majority, especially Chief Justice Rehnquist, who
penned the Garrett opinion. Thus, apparent dictum from Garrett may in fact preclude
application of Corbin to complex crimes in future cases.
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lish an essential element of the crime charged, the prosecution must
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant had
already been tried.95 This has been deemed the "same conduct" test. 6
The Court further noted that a present prosecution bars a later prosecu-
tion of a "component offense"'97 if proof of all the elements of that com-
ponent offense were required to prove the present prosecution.98
Corbin invoked a two-step inquiry for double jeopardy analysis. First,
the reviewing court looks to the statute itself to determine whether the
legislature in fact intended to create a separate crime. This is an adapta-
tion of the Blockburger reasoning. 99 Second, and most significantly, the
inquiry focuses on the conduct that the state must prove. 100
Justice Brennan's majority opinion rejected New York State's argu-
ment that the Blockburger test is the only hurdle that has to be surpassed
in successive prosecution cases,10 reasoning that successive prosecutions
raise concerns that multiple punishment cases do not.'02 Although the
opinion cited these concerns in holding that successive prosecutions must
satisfy something beyond the Blockburger test, at least one commentary
notes that it failed to "elaborate on the significance of these concerns or
on ways in which the Corbin rule is tailored to serve them."103
The Corbin opinion stated that a "technical comparison of the ele-
ments of the two offenses as required by Blockburger" does not ade-
95. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2087, 2093.
96. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 (1990); see also United States v. Gam-
bino, 742 F. Supp. 855, 857 (S.D.N.Y.) (referring to test as a same-conduct test), aff'd in
part, 920 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990). This name is somewhat misleading. The Corbin
decision does not hold that the double jeopardy clause bars reprosecution of the "same
conduct"; it holds that a subsequent prosecution would be barred where the State needs
to prove the prior conduct as part of its case. See Corbin, 110 S. CL at 2087.
97. A "component offense" is the same as a "predicate offense" because they are
crimes that make up a larger overall complex crime. This term is borrowed from lan-
guage in the Corbin opinion. See infra note 98 and accompanying text. Indeed, the
Court's recognition of component offenses contradicts any suggestion that Corbin was
intended to apply exclusively to simple crimes. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying
text.
98. See Corbin, 110 S. CL at 2093 n.11.
99. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. CL 2084, 2090 (1990).
100. See id. at 2093. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's continued admonition that
the Blockburger test is only one of statutory construction, the language of the test shows
that it is a same-evidence test because the test only allows prosecution of offenses that
have distinct sets of proof. Cf Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 705 n.l (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing elements of same-evidence test) (citing Morey v.
Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871)); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at
269-73 (same). Justice Brennan's emphasis that the Corbin test is not a same-evidence
test is apparently a response to Justice O'Connor's dissent, which argued that Corbin is
inconsistent with an earlier decision by the Court that rejected any reference to that test
in double jeopardy analysis. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
101. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2092.
102. See id. at 2091-92.
103. The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 155
(1990). For a good discussion of how the Corbin rule protects the concerns arising from
successive prosecutions, see i&L at 155-57.
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quately protect the interests particular to successive prosecutions. 04 The
decision recognized that when the defendant has committed several of-
fenses over the course of a single criminal transaction, successive prose-
cutions for each offense would be permitted under the same-evidence test
because each offense has its own distinct set of proof.° 5 The defendant,
however, may be subjected to prosecutorial harassment and unjustified
suffering by a series of separate prosecutions.106 Furthermore, the de-
fendant may suffer an enhanced risk of erroneous conviction because
prior acquittal on one charge would not bar a subsequent prosecution on
a related offense.' 07 The Corbin opinion implicitly addressed these con-
cerns by focusing on the conduct circumscribed by each offense and fur-
ther by requiring prosecution of all conduct-related charges in a single
proceeding.
Justice O'Connor dissented from Justice Brennan's reasoning, arguing
that the opinion was inconsistent with the Court's earlier decision in
Dowling v. United States.'08 In Dowling, the Court had held that use of
the same evidence in a subsequent proceeding does not necessarily violate
double jeopardy constraints."°w The Dowling Court reasoned that collat-
eral estoppel, which precludes relitigation of factual issues already de-
cided, does not bar testimony that was previously used because the
"prior acquittal did not determine [the] ultimate issue in the present
case."" 0 In her Corbin dissent, Justice O'Connor argued that the testi-
mony in Dowling would have been barred by the Corbin test because it
would "prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant
had already been prosecuted.""'
In a separate dissent in Corbin, Justice Scalia argued that the majority
104. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2093 (1990); see also Note, Bar to Reintro-
ducing Evidence, supra note 21, at 966 (1980) (the same-evidence test "provides inade-
quate protection in cases of successive prosecutions"); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra
note 2, at 274-75 (noting same-evidence test does not adequately protect certain inter-
ests); cf Note, Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, supra note 21, at 968 (noting that com-
mon-law variation of same-transaction test "reflects a sensitivity to the distinction
between simultaneous and successive prosecutions left unaddressed by the same-evidence
test").
105. See, eg., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 201 Ky. 314, 256 S.W. 388 (1923) (75 suc-
cessive prosecutions for 75 poker hands, each of which constitutes separate offense of
gambling). But see Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (subsequent prosecution for
robbing one poker player barred after acquittal in previous prosecution for robbing an-
other poker player in same game).
106. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
108. 493 U.S. 342 (1990); see Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2095 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. See Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 110 S. Ct. 668, 672 (1990).
110. Id. The import of the holding is that, for the defendant to claim collateral estop-
pel successfully, she must be able to prove that the issue previously adjudicated in her
favor is the same as the issue in the current prosecution. See Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 673-
74.
111. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting language of the
opinion).
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opinion "depart[ed] from clear text and clear precedent"'1 2 in favor of
Vitale's dictum that a subsequent prosecution that relies on proof of the
previously-prosecuted lesser offense would be barred." 3  In Justice
Scalia's view, the double jeopardy clause does not protect the right
against being twice put in jeopardy for the same conduct, but "guaran-
tees only the right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same of-
fense.""' 4 Citing both textual 15 and historical" 6 evidence, Justice Scalia
argued that the double jeopardy clause has been interpreted to permit
successive prosecution of different crimes based upon the same acts." 7
Historical interpretation of the double jeopardy clause, however, is of
limited utility in this context because, with the advent of complex, over-
lapping statutes in the criminal justice system, the possibility of unfair
and unconstitutional re-prosecutions has significantly increased and dra-
matically changed.1 ' Furthermore, the common-law practice of charg-
ing all relevant offenses in a single proceeding, 9 which would satisfy the
requirements of the same-transaction test, has largely been abrogated. 2 °
Moreover, as Justice Brennan pointed out, Justice Scalia's "historic" ex-
amples of the Court's application of the Blockburger test in defining
"same offense" concerned the permissibility of multiple punishment
rather than successive prosecutions.' 2 ' Rather than addressing the suc-
cessive prosecution concerns of finality, protection against prosecutorial
harassment and prevention of erroneous conviction, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that the Blockburger test "reflected a venerable understanding" of
the definition of "same offense."'" The Blockburger test, which empha-
sized the predominance of statutory construction, does not protect the
112. See Corbin, 110 S. CL at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
113. See Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 419-21 (1980); supra notes 58-60 and accom-
panying text.
114. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2096 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such a narrow reading of
the clause, however, is inconsistent with general jeopardy principles. See, eg., Brown v.
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 164 (1977) ("It has long been understood that separate statutory
crimes need not be identical--either in constituent elements or in actual proof-in order
to be the same within the meaning of the [double jeopardy] prohibition."); Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 269 ("iThe courts have never used such a narrow definition of
offense. Most courts sense that the policies of double jeopardy embrace closely related or
overlapping offenses as well.").
115. See Corbin, 110 S. CL at 2096-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
116. See id at 2098-101.
117. See id at 2096.
118. See supra note 2.
119. See Note, Bar to Reintroducing Evidence, supra note 21, at 967-68; Note, Twice in
Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 266 n.13. At common law, the practice was difficult and there
was little incentive for charging offenses arising out of the same transaction over several
separate prosecutions. See Note, Statutory Implementation, supra note 2, at 342-43;
Note, Consecutive Sentences in Single Prosecutions: Judicial Multiplication of Statutory
Penalties, 67 Yale L.J. 916, 918-20 (1958).
120. Moreover, the proliferation of overlapping statutory offenses has increased succes-
sive prosecutions. See supra note 2.
121. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2091 n.8 (1990).
122. See id. at 2100.
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constitutional interests involved in avoiding successive prosecutions,
however. 123
B. Implications of Corbin in RICO Prosecutions--Lower Court
Responses
Several circuits have disagreed as to whether Corbin bars successive
prosecutions for both predicate crimes and the RICO crime. 24  The
Third Circuit reasoned that RICO is a complex crime and found that
Congress intended to create a separate crime with separate enhanced
penalties.125 Relying on Garrett's dictum,126 the Third Circuit held the
Corbin decision inapplicable to RICO prosecutions, 27 and continued its
statutory approach to resolution of successive prosecution problems in
complex crimes.' 28  The Eleventh Circuit has since agreed and has
adopted the Third Circuit's approach to resolution of successive prosecu-
tion issues in RICO prosecutions. 29
Case law in the Second Circuit is in some confusion. Initially, in
United States v. Calderone,'30 the Second Circuit held that the Corbin
opinion "was intended to guide double jeopardy analysis in all cases in-
volving successive prosecutions."' 3' Subsequently in United States v.
Gambino,132 however, the Second Circuit stated that Corbin applies only
to simple crimes and conspiracies 33 and cited the Third Circuit decision
with approval. 34 The court further noted that the principles in Garrett
still apply to complex crimes. 13  Despite the ambiguity in the Second
123. Justice Brennan's same-conduct test addresses these concerns and is more suited
to modern circumstances. Cf The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 129, 157 (1990) (advocating that Court must interpret double jeopardy
under "current circumstances"); McKay, Double Jeopardy: Are the Pieces the Puzzle?, 23
Washburn L.J. 1, 1 (1983) (advocating that Court should "approach double jeopardy
from a functional perspective").
124. Compare United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1010-11 (3d Cir. 1990) (not-
ing Corbin does not apply beyond crimes involving "a single course of conduct"), cert.
denied, 11l S. Ct. 2009 (1991) with United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 721 (2d
Cir. 1990) ("the Court's [opinion] suggest[s] that the [Corbin] test was intended to guide
double jeopardy analysis in all cases involving successive prosecutions").
125. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1108-09.
126. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
127. See Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1110-11 & n.29.
128. See id.
129. See United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1537 (lth Cir. 1991); United
States v. Link, 921 F.2d 1523, 1529-30 (lth Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2273 (1991).
130. 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990).
131. Id. at 721 (emphasis added). Calderone also correctly addressed the underlying
policies of the double jeopardy bar against successive prosecutions. See id. at 722.
132. 920 F.2d 1108 (2d cir. 1990).
133. See id. at 1112-13.
134. See id. at 1113; see also United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1013-14 n.8 (2d
Cir.) ("[W]e do not regard [Corbin] as precluding the proof of previously prosecuted
conduct as predicate acts in a subsequent RICO prosecution."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 57
(1990).
135. See Gambino, 920 F.2d at 1113. The actual holding of the Gambino court, how-
ever, was that the subsequent RICO prosecution was not barred because there were sev-
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Circuit, the Tenth Circuit has since adopted the reasoning of Calder-
one 136 and held that Corbin "applies to all double jeopardy claims arising
in the context of successive prosecutions."'
' 37
In addition, the Second and Third Circuits are in disagreement over
whether a subsequent prosecution of the predicate offense is barred after
acquittal on the RICO crime. The Third Circuit reasoned that racketeer-
ing "conduct" constitutes an offense distinct from the predicate offenses,
and thus allowed a subsequent prosecution of the predicate offenses after
a RICO acquittal. 138  The Corbin opinion, however, specifically stated
that a subsequent prosecution of a "component offense" is barred if the
government relied on proof of conduct constituting that offense in a prior
proceeding.'39 The Second Circuit properly barred a subsequent prose-
cution of a predicate offense after an acquittal of a RICO charge, holding
it to be "inconsistent" with Corbin's reasoning."4
C. Applying Corbin to RICO Cases
For the most part, the circuit court opinions that have expressly or
impliedly limited Corbin to "simple" crimes 4 ' are premised on language
in Garrett v. United States.42 Even though Corbin did not expressly
overrule Garrett,4 3 Corbin may have distinguished Garrett as standing
eral predicate acts that occurred after the initial prosecution. See id. Hence, the facts of
Gambino, like the facts in Garrett, fall into the exception expressed both in Brown and
Corbin, which allowed subsequent prosecutions due to the emergence or the discovery of
additional facts. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 n.7 (1990); Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977); see also United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 650 (7th
Cir. 1991) (RICO prosecution not barred by Corbin test because additional necessary
facts had not occurred by time of first predicate offense prosecution).
136. See United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d 1522, 1527-28 (10th Cir. 1991).
137. See ic. at 1528 (quoting Calderone, 917 F.2d at 721).
138. See United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1990), cerm dismissed, Ill
S. Ct. 806 (1991). Esposito is interesting for the additional reason that it acknowledged
the underlying policies against successive prosecutions and, in contrast to another case in
the same circuit, stated that "there is no exception from the Double Jeopardy Clause for
complex statutory crimes." Id at 62.
139. This is the converse of Corbin's conduct-based standard and is articulated in the
Corbin opinion. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2093 n.11 (1990). Indeed,
Corbin's reference to "component offense" contradicts any inference that the opinion was
intended only to apply to simple crimes, because "component offenses" make up larger
complex offenses.
140. See United States v. Russo, 906 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
141. See United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530, 1537 (11th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Link, 921 F.2d 1523, 1529-30 (11th Cir.), cert denied, I11 S. Ct. 2273 (1991);
United States v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Scarpa,
913 F.2d 993, 1013-14 n.8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 57 (1990); Esposito, 912 F.2d
at 62-64; United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1108-09 (3d Cir. 1990), cert denied,
111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991).
142. 471 U.S. 773 (1985).
143. See, eg., Gambino, 920 F.2d at 1113 ("[Ihe principles underlying Garrett survive
[Corbin]."); Pungitore, 910 F.2d at 1111 n.29 ("We dismiss out of hand the possibility
that [Corbin] overruled Garrett. If the Supreme Court... intended to abandon Garrett,
... it would have said so.").
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solely for multiple punishment issues."4 To the extent that there is ten-
sion between the two cases on the issue of successive prosecution, Garrett
obviously is limited by the fact that it falls within the exception noted in
Brown that would allow successive prosecutions when the greater offense
continues after prosecution of the lesser offense.' 4 ' Garrett itself did not
create a blanket exception to double jeopardy law for complex crimes,',
and nothing in Corbin indicates that the decision was intended to apply
solely to simple crimes.'47
Returning to the case of Dana Defendant, Dana claims a violation of
her double jeopardy rights, as refined by the Corbin decision. Pursuant
to Corbin's conduct-based standard, her subsequent RICO trial is barred
if it depended on proof of conduct constituting the previously-prosecuted
drug offenses.' 48 The first prosecution of the drug possession offense
would not, however, prohibit the subsequent prosecution of the RICO
case because the second predicate offense had not yet occurred at the
time of the first trial. 149 Moreover, Peter Prosecutor may claim the same
exception with respect to the later prosecution of the drug distribution
crime, arguing that, by the time of that prosecution, he had not discov-
ered facts constituting proof of the existence of a RICO enterprise in
which Dana Defendant was involved. Assuming that Peter Prosecutor
had adequate proof to charge a RICO offense during the second prosecu-
tion for drug distribution, however, application of Corbin would prohibit
the subsequent RICO trial against Dana Defendant.
The Corbin opinion cited the relevant interests that need to be ad-
dressed in successive prosecution cases. 150 Application of Corbin's broad
conduct-based standard should therefore depend on the double jeopardy
interests that are involved by the particular facts of each case. 5 1 Because
finality is the least important interest and can be easily overridden, 152
144. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090-91 (1990). The Corbin opinion did
not refer to Garrett during its subsequent discussion of the successive prosecution issue,
except as a reference that the court has never adopted a same-transaction test. See id. at
2094 n. 15.
145. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 74-77 (discuss-
ing tension between Garrett and Brown).
146. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
147. Moreover, the Court's reference to component offenses, which make up "complex
crimes," implies that Corbin was intended to apply to both simple and complex crimes.
See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2093 n. 11; supra note 97-98.
148. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 (1990).
149. See id. at 2090 n.7; Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977); see, e.g., United
States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 650 (7th Cir. 1990) (RICO prosecution not barred by
Corbin test because additional necessary facts had not occurred by time of prosecution of
first predicate offense); United States v. Gambino, 920 F.2d 1108, 1113 (2d Cir. 1990)
(same); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1110 (3d Cir. 1990) (same), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991).
150. See supra notes 101-06 and accompanying text.
151. Commentators have argued that application of the double jeopardy bar should
turn on the underlying policies that are endangered by the specific facts of the case, rather
than any hard and fast double jeopardy rule. See supra note 123.
152. See supra note 16-18 and accompanying text.
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application of Corbin in RICO prosecutions turns on the dangers of
prosecutorial overreaching and erroneous conviction. It is debatable
whether Peter Prosecutor's actions could be termed "overreaching" and
whether there are reasonable justifications for Dana Defendant's hard-
ships in defending against a subsequent RICO prosecution. There is,
however, a significant danger of error in undermining Dana Defendant's
previous acquittal on one of the predicate offenses. 153 When a subse-
quent RICO prosecution depends on conduct that constitutes an offense
for which the defendant has previously been acquitted, application of the
Corbin holding is particularly important to guard against the risk of a
bad verdict." Given the criminal justice system's cardinal concern that
an innocent person not be wrongly convicted, application of Corbin's
double jeopardy standard is fully justified when there has been a previous
acquittal.
D. General Implications of the Corbin Decision
Aside from Corbin's potential impact on successive prosecutions of
complex crimes, the decision carries additional implications which
should be noted.
Preliminarily, Corbin concerns successive prosecution cases, not multi-
ple punishment cases.' 5 Although Corbin, which dealt only with simple
crimes, did not alter RICO multiple punishment analysis, the double
jeopardy clause may still bar additional punishment for conduct for
which the defendant had already been convicted.' 56
Second, Corbin adopts the exception noted in Brown that double jeop-
ardy principles will allow successive prosecutions when the state was un-
153. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
154. There is a split in the circuits as to this contention, however. The Seventh Circuit
allowed a subsequent RICO prosecution using predicate murder offenses for which the
defendant was previously acquitted. See United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647 (7th Cir.
1991). The Third Circuit allowed a subsequent prosecution of the predicate crime after
the acquittal of the overarching RICO charge. See United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60
(3d Cir. 1990), cert dismissed, 111 S. CL 806 (1991). The Second Circuit, in contrast,
barred a subsequent prosecution of the predicate offense after an acquittal on the over-
arching RICO charge. See United States v. Russo, 906 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1990) (per
curiam).
155. See, eg., Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2090-91 (distinguishing successive prosecution issue
from multiple punishment cases); United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 417 n.13
(7th Cir. 1990) ("[b]y its own terms, [Corbin] only applies to subsequent prosecutions");
United States v. Ortiz-Alarcon, 917 F.2d 651, 654 (1st Cir. 1990) (Corbin "pertains only
to successive prosecutions"), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 2035 (1991); United States v.
Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1117 n.42 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[Corbin] was concerned with the
double jeopardy implications of multiple prosecutions, which raise entirely different con-
siderations than do consecutive sentences"), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 2009 (1991).
156. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989) (holding that civil
RICO penalty for conduct for which defendant had already been convicted violates
double jeopardy clause). See generally Note, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy
Clause: Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings After United
States v. Halper, 76 Va. L. Rev. 1251 (1990) (discussing Halper and its potential impact
on civil penalties and multiplicity claims).
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able to proceed with the additional charge in the first prosecution
because necessary additional facts had not occurred or had not been dis-
covered at the time of the first proceeding.157
In addition, under Corbin's same-conduct test, reintroduction of the
testimony in Dowling would be barred because it tends to prove conduct
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant was previously prose-
cuted.158 Justice Brennan maintained that the same-conduct test did not
encompass a same-evidence criterion, and that the double jeopardy
clause precludes proof of conduct that constitutes an offense previously
prosecuted rather than preclude reintroduction of the same evidence."5 9
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's argument, however, any evidence that
tends to prove the previously-prosecuted conduct would be barred by
Corbin's broad test.)"
It is also unclear what implications, if any, Corbin has on the dual
sovereignty doctrine, 61 which is a general exception to double jeopardy
law. Under the dual sovereignty doctrine, double jeopardy does not ap-
ply where the separate prosecutions of the same criminal acts were initi-
ated by the state and federal governments, because both governments are
sovereigns and independently have the power to establish criminal stat-
utes and require punishment for their violation.1 62 If a court is to apply
the double jeopardy prohibition based on the relevant interests1 63 in-
volved, as implied in Corbin,'6" the dual sovereignty doctrine, which
frustrates protection of those interests, should be reconsidered. 65
157. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2090 n.7 (1990); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S.
161, 169 n.7 (1977).
158. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2095-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also The Supreme
Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 157 (1990) ("In cases such as
Dowling, Corbin may prevent the reintroduction of any evidence from a prior prosecu-
tion, because the very context required to establish relevance would often prove the previ-
ously prosecuted conduct.").
159. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2093 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 129, 154
(1990).
161. The dual sovereignty doctrine is premised on federalism and the notion that the
state and federal governments are separate sovereigns, "deriving power from different
sources [and] capable of dealing with the same subject-matter [sic] within the same terri-
tory." United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). In Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187 (1959), the Court held that double jeopardy law does not apply in the context of
successive state and federal prosecutions, stating that "an act denounced as a crime by
both national and state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both
and may be punished by each." Abbate, 359 U.S. at 194 (quoting Lanza, 260 U.S. at
382); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (state prosecution on same evidence
after acquittal for federal offense does not violate double jeopardy clause). For a compre-
hensive discussion of the dual sovereignty doctrine, see generally Murchison, The Dual
Sovereignty Exception to Double Jeopardy, 14 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 383 (1986).
162. See Abbate, 359 U.S. at 194.
163. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
164. See Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2091-93 (1990).
165. For example, the dual sovereignty doctrine would allow a federal prosecution
after a state acquittal for the same criminal act. Given the high risk of an erroneous
conviction, see supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text, the subsequent federal prosecu-
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The Corbin decision's conduct-based standard admittedly presents
problems in application, specifically with regard to what conduct consti-
tutes an offense for which the defendant was previously prosecuted. Jus-
tice Scalia recognized this problem in his dissent,'6 6 and several courts
have struggled with the definition of "conduct that constitutes" the pre-
viously-tried offense.167 This ambiguity, however, does not diminish the
need to refocus successive prosecution analysis on underlying policy
concerns.
Finally, it is arguable that the defendant is necessarily engaging in the
same acts or participating in the same conduct during "one criminal
transaction."' 6 Thus, Corbin's same-conduct test is similar to the same-
tion arguably would violate the double jeopardy bar. This problem also exists in cases
where one predicate crime underlying a complex federal offense has already been prose-
cuted by the state. Prior to Corbin, courts have held that a subsequent RICO prosecution
based on predicate offenses previously tried by the state does not violate double jeopardy
law on the ground that the two prosecutions were initiated by separate sovereigns. See
United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, 309 (7th Cir. 1979), cerL denied, 445 U.S. 946
(1980); United States v. Malatesta, 583 F.2d 748, 757 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 846 (1979). Current case law in the circuit courts suggests that Corbin does not
change this contention. See, eg., United States v. Giovanelli, No. 89-1604, slip op. at
7580 (2d Cir. Sept. 13, 1991) ('[U]nder the dual sovereignty doctrine a federal indictment
charging conduct that was previously the subject of a state prosecution... does not
implicate the double jeopardy clause."); United States v. Farmer, 924 F.2d 647, 650 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("Given the 'dual sovereignty' doctrine,... successive state and federal prose-
cutions for the same acts do not offend the [double jeopardy clause].").
166. See Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2102404 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. See, eg., United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717, 722-26 (2d Cir. 1990) (New-
man, J., concurring) (discussing definition of "conduct" in prior conspiracy charge);
United States v. Esposito, 912 F.2d 60, 65 (3d Cir. 1990) (prior RICO racketeering con-
duct constitutes offense different from predicate offense), cerL dismissed, I ll S. Ct. 806
(1991).
The definitional problems raised in Corbin's conduct-based standard are similar to the
definitional problems of the same-transaction test. Discussion and resolution of these
problems in Corbin's conduct-based standard is beyond the scope of the Comment.
168. For a number of years, Justice Brennan has been championing a same-transaction
test for application in double jeopardy analysis. See, eg., Jones v. Thomas, 491 U.S. 376,
387-88 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("the Double Jeopardy Clause requires, except in
very limited circumstances, that all charges against a defendant growing out of a single
criminal transaction be tried in one proceeding"); Borchardt v. United States, 469 U.S.
937, 940 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (advocating that double
jeopardy clause mandates prosecution of all offenses arising from one "transaction" in a
single prosecution); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S. 682, 683 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) (same); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 170 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring) (same);
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 & n.7 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (same); see
also Westen & Drubel, supra note 8, at 163 ("[Brennan's] argument ... rests on the
assumption that where the overlap in evidence is substantial, the State has no sufficient
interest in separate trials that would justify the burden that successive prosecution im-
poses on a defendant's interest in finality."). This position has never been adopted by the
rest of the Court. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985) ("We have
steadfastly refused to adopt the 'single transaction' view of the Double Jeopardy
Clause."); see also Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 448 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("I
wish to make explicit my understanding that the Court's opinion in no way intimates that
the Double Jeopardy Clause embraces to any degree the 'same transaction' concept re-
flected in the concurring opinion of [Justice] Brennan."). Moreover, commentators have
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transaction test, 169 and serves most of its preclusive goals by forcing
prosecution in a single proceeding of all possible charges that may
arise."' By combining the Blockburger test of statutory construction
with a conduct-based standard,'7 1 the Corbin holding incorporates the
two traditional approaches to double jeopardy analysis--one emphasiz-
ing legislatively-defined offenses (a same-evidence test), and one focusing
on the actual acts that the defendant committed (a same-transaction
test). 172
CONCLUSION
The prevalence of successive prosecutions attendant with overlapping
and duplicitous offenses raises certain interests that Blockburger's same-
evidence test did not adequately address. The Corbin decision recog-
nized the inadequacy of Blockburger in successive prosecutions and at-
tempted to solve this problem by requiring the prosecution of all
conduct-related charges in a single proceeding.
In addition, some courts facing the issue of successive prosecutions in
complex crimes have adopted a statutory approach that originated in
complex crime cases dealing with multiplicity issues. This statutory ap-
proach to the question of successive prosecutions should be discontinued
because the judicial analysis that follows, as an exception for complex
crimes, has disregarded the particular concerns that underlie the bar
against successive prosecutions-namely, the interests of finality, protec-
tion against prosecutorial harassment and maintaining the integrity of a
prior acquittal. These interests are as present in the context of complex
statutory crimes as they are in the context of simple traditional crimes.
Although limited exceptions may be appropriate in light of specific cir-
argued that the same-transaction test is analytically difficult. See, e.g., Westen & Drubel,
supra note 8, at 114 ("There is simply no way to make sense out of the notion that a
course of conduct is 'really' only one act .... or... as many as one likes."); Note, Twice
in Jeopardy, supra note 2, at 276 ("The principle shortcoming of [the] approach is that
any sequence of conduct can be defined as an 'act' or a 'transaction.' An act or transac-
tion itself determines nothing.").
169. Cf Corbin, 110 S. Ct. at 2104 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We will thus have fully
embraced [the] 'same transaction' theory.").
170. See, e.g., Grady v. Corbin, 110 S. Ct. 2084, 2095 (1990) ("With adequate prepara-
tion and foresight, the State could have prosecuted Corbin for the offenses charged in the
traffic tickets and the subsequent indictment in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding this
double jeopardy question."); id. at 2105 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[]rosecutors... will be
well advised to proceed on the assumption that the 'same transaction' theory has already
been adopted."); see also The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 Harv. L.
Rev. 129, 157 (1990) ("In practice, ... the [Corbin] test may expand double jeopardy
protection almost as far as the 'same transaction' test by encouraging joinder of all
charges and creating an obstacle to the reintroduction of any evidence.").
171. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text. In practice, however, the legisla-
tive-intent part of the Corbin test is meaningless because a subsequent prosecution, even if
it meets the Blockburger criterion, would have to pass constitutional muster under the
conduct-based standard.
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cumstances and the double jeopardy interests that are invoked, courts
should at least address the relevant policy concerns in their resolution of
successive prosecution issues. To that extent, the Corbin decision and its
conduct-based test should be utilized to provide guidance for the courts.

